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21. INTRODUCTION
Economists have long been interested in strategic settings in which several interested
parties (perhaps with opposed interests) attempt to influence a common agent to do their
bidding. In the almost three decades that have passed since the seminal strategic analysis
by Bernheim andWhinston (1986), the truthful equilibrium of their complete-information
model of menu auctions and influence games has become a work horse in a wide range
of settings. Applications include international trade (e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1994,
1995, 2001), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), Goldberg andMaggi (1997)), combina-
torial auction design (e.g., Milgrom (2007)), industrial organization (e.g., Bernheim and
Whinston (1989), Inderst and Wey (2007)) and political economy and public finance (e.g.,
Aidt (1998), Laussel and LeBreton (1998, 2001), Persson and Tabellini (2002), Bellettini and
Ottaviano (2005)).
The menu auctions game of Bernheim andWhinston (1986) owes its success, in part, to
the simplicity and robustness of its equilibrium characterization, even in what may at first
glance appear to be very complicated strategic settings. To review, the basic game con-
sists of n principals and a single common agent. The agent chooses some action, q 2 Q,
that has payoff consequences for each of the principals. Prior to taking an action, how-
ever, the principals may each offer the agent enforceable payment schedules – menus
of promised payment-action pairs (possibly subject to constraints such as nonnegativity).
After receiving a menu offer from each principal, the agent chooses an action to maximize
utility. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that there are a large number of equilibria to
this influence game, but there is always an equilibrium in which the agent chooses an
action which maximizes the collective surplus of the principals and the agent. Such a
surplus-maximizing equilibrium can be supported with “truthful” menus in which each
principal offers a transfer schedule whose marginal transfer is equal to the principal’s
marginal benefit of action. Furthermore, this truthful equilibrium allocation is also the
only one that is immune to a reasonable class of renegotiations – formally, the equilib-
rium is a Coaltional-Proof Nash Equilibrium. As a result, Bernheim and Whinston argue
that the surplus-maximizing outcome (relative to the set of principals and the agent) is
a reasonable equilibrium to use for predicting behavior in general menu auction games
with complete information.
The novel contribution of this paper is to reconsider influence games under the assump-
3tion that the agent has private information.1 When the common agent possesses private
information,2 two technical difficulties are introduced. First, if principals are allowed to
choose discontinuous payment schedules, then we must entertain the possibility that the
equilibrium payment functions are discontinuous. In this case, each individual principal’s
optimization problem is itself discontinuous. As such, standard control-theory techniques
which assume continuity (and typically piecewise differentiability) cannot be applied to
the problem. Fortunately, we are able to modify results from the mathematics literature
on non-smooth optimal control to address this problem. A second difficulty introduced
from asymmetric information is that an individual principal may only choose to influence
a strict subset of types in equilibrium. The sets of types on which each principal is active
must be determined in order to construct equilibrium tariffs, but the equilibrium tariffs,
in turn, determine the regions of activity. In short, the equilibrium activity sets must be
jointly determined at the fixed point of the principals’ best-response correspondences.3
Fortunately, we are able to address this difficulty and obtain closed-form solutions by
1Although there are a few antecedents to this approach – Laffont and Tirole (1991), Martimort (1996,
2007), LeBreton and Salanie´ (2003) – these papers rely on highly-stylized settings and (sometimes implicit)
equilibrium refinements for their results. Moreover, these earlier models ignored the endogeneity of the
principals’ activity sets by either assuming symmetry or assumptions which guaranteed full coverage. Our
paper provides the first general analysis of this class of influence games and explicitly characterizes the
principals’ activity sets.
2The present paper is related to an older literature which examines common agency with a privately
informed agent under the assumption that each principal can only contract over a distinct subset of the
agent’s actions. This has been referred to as the private contracts assumption, to distinguish it from the
present setting of public contracting. For example, Martimort and Stole (2009) assume that the principals
are firms selling their output to a common consumer. Principal 1, however, can only condition its contract
on the consumer’s purchases of its good, q1; the consumer’s purchases of the rival’s product, q2, is not
contractible by principal 1. Thus, (q1, q2) 2 Q1 ⇥Q2 is the agent’s action, but principal i is only allowed to
offer a payment schedule ti : Qi ! R.
3In previous work, Martimort and Stole (2012), we allowed transfer payments to be negative and as-
sumed that the agent must accept all or none of the offered contracts. Formally, this is known as the case of
intrinsic common agency. This is the appropriate setting if the principals have some control of the agent’s
choice as in the case of public regulation by different government agencies. When common agency is in-
trinsic, the activity sets of the principals always coincide, so equilibrium analysis of these games avoids
the difficulties in the present paper. Nonetheless, intrinsic common agency with public contracts provides
an interesting comparison for the influence games in the current paper, which we discuss in a subsequent
section of this paper.
4assuming that each principal has linear preferences over Q.
As in Bernheim and Whinston’s (1986) complete information game, we find an infinite
number of equilibria. Rather than propose an equilibrium refinement at the outset, we
instead construct conditions for the set of all equilibria. Our main theoretical contribution,
Theorem 1, demonstrates that all equilibria exhibit the same confluence of information-
rent terms and that the q-type agent’s equilibrium choice q(q) is identical across all equi-
libria in which there is full separation in the neighborhood of q. One particular equilib-
rium allocation –what we call themaximal equilibrium – always exists, is easy to compute,
exhibits maximal separation, and is implemented with continuous contracts. The limit of
the expectation of the marginal tariff in the maximal equilibrium as the game becomes
one of complete information also equals the marginal tariff in the truthful equilibrium of
Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Additionally, for any equilibrium allocation, and for any
subset of types for which there is full separation in the equilibrium allocation, we demon-
strate that the equilibrium allocation must coincide with the maximal allocation. These
properties motivate us to focus on the maximal equilibrium allocation when performing
comparative static exercises in the applications of Section V, though we remain somewhat
agnostic about imposing this refinement. To this end, we also characterize a particularly
interesting discontinuous equilibrium in one of our applications and illustrate how one
can construct such equilibria in general.
Two settings providemotivating applications whichwe study. First, we consider games
in which the preferences of all principals reflect a general consensus that more activity by
the agent is desirable, holding the amount of transfers fixed. In this case, we say that
preferences are congruent. As an application, suppose that the n principals all value some
public good, q, produced by the agent, but the principals value the good with possibly
different intensities (relative to their marginal utility of money). The agent has private in-
formation about the cost of providing the good, q, and so each principal will individually
consider the tradeoff of greater provision against the reduction of the agent’s information
rent. In a world with one principal, the setting is analogous to the government regulation
of a monopolist with unknown marginal cost, Baron and Myerson (1982). With multiple
principals, however, we will see that there are additional effects that may generate an
allocation that looks considerably different from either the first-best allocation (which is
also the truthful equilibrium of Bernheim andWhinston’s complete information game) or
5the Baron-Myerson allocation.
Second, we also consider games in which some principals prefer higher q, and other
principals prefer a lower q. Thus, we can think of there being two “interest groups” with
opposed preferences, although the principals within each group have congruent prefer-
ences and act noncooperatively. The most natural application is one where the agent is a
politician with some a privately-known ideal policy point, and the principals are lobby-
ists offering political contributions as functions of the politician’s policy choice, q. As in
the public good example, each principal will consider the tradeoff between influencing
the agent to choose a more preferred policy against the ability to reduce the information
rents paid to the agent (e.g., total campaign contributions). Unlike the setting in which all
principals are congruent in their preferences, we will find that the informational-rent dis-
tortions of the principals are combined into an interesting and novel marginal distortion.
In both the public goods game and the lobbying game, we also characterize interesting
comparative statics on principal preferences and the equilibrium influence the principals
exert on the agent. Among other results, applying Jensen’s inequality to the equilibrium
information-rent confluence function implies that dispersed preferences within an inter-
est group (small and large stakeholders rather than homogenous stakeholders) leads to
more influence. We also show that an increase in one principal’s preferences leads to more
influence, but with some crowding out of the contributions of liked-minded principals.
Lastly, we demonstrate that a mean-preserving spread of principal preferences in the po-
litical lobbying game that does not affect the first-best policy choice, nonetheless leads to
a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of equilibrium policies.
The basic influence game with incomplete information is presented in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3 we analyze the best-response correspondence of a typical principal and present our
key building block for our discontinuous control program in Lemma 1. Necessary con-
ditions characterizing the role of information rents in any equilibrium are presented in
Section 4, along with sufficient conditions for the maximal equilibrium. We turn to ap-
plications in Section 5 and analyze the maximal equilibria in both the public goods and
lobbying games. We also further explore discontinuous equilibria in the setting of lobby-
ing games, illustrating in a concrete example the similarities and differences between the
maximal and discontinuous equilibria. Section 6 concludes.
62. A MODEL OF INFLUENCEWITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Our economic influence game is a setting in which each of n principals simultaneously
offers a common agent a nonnegative payment schedule that rewards the agent for the
choice of action, q 2 Q ⇢ R. Formally, we allow each principal i to present to the agent
any upper-semicontinuous function, ti : Q ! R+, as its contract offer.4 Following such
offers, the agent chooses an action to maximize utility given the promised payments.
Each principal has preferences that are linear in both the agent’s choice of q and in
monetary transfers. Given a contract ti and a choice of q by the agent, we denote principal
i’s payoff as simply siq  ti(q). We will indicate that a principal has a positive preference
for q, si > 0, by the index set i 2 A; similarly, a principal with negative preferences for q,
si < 0, will be indicated by i 2 B. The set of all principals is N = A [ B.
The agent has heterogeneous preferences, indexed by q 2 Q = [q, q], chosen by nature
at the start of the game according to a commonly-known distribution function, F, with
an associated positive, atomless density function f . The agent’s preferences over action q
and monetary transfers t, conditional on q, is
S0(q)  qq+ t,
where S0 is a continuously differentiable, strictly concave function. We make two addi-
tional assumptions on the distribution of types to avoid technical complications in the
arguments which follow. First, in order to guarantee that the solutions to a relaxed pro-
gram are monotone, we make the familiar assumption that the distribution function, F,
and its complement, 1  F, are log concave. Second, in order to obtain interior principal
activity sets, we assume that each principal’s marginal preference, si, is not too large rela-
tive to the heterogeneity of agent preferences. Specifically, we require that there exists an
interior type qˆi such that si = F(qˆi)/ f (qˆi) for i 2 A and |si| = (1  F(qˆi)/ f (qˆi) for i 2 B.
The implication of this assumption (yet to be shown) is that each principal will actively
influence a proper subset of agent types.5
4Requiring the schedules be nonnegative is without loss of generality if the agent has the option to reject
any subset of the offered schedules (i.e., if common agency is delegated). When the agent must either accept
of reject the entire set of the n offers, then common agency is intrinsic. The set of equilibria for this simpler
setting is explored in Martimort and Stole (2012).
5It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case in which principals might be active for every agent
7The timing of the influence game is simple. First, nature chooses the agent’s type.
Second, each principal i chooses a transfer function, ti 2 T , where T is the set of non-
negative, upper-semicontinuous functions on Q. We will denote T i(q) ⌘ Âj 6=i tj(q) and
T(q) ⌘ Âi2N ti(q) as the associated aggregate transfers of the principals from this stage.
Third, the agent chooses an optimal action given the aggregate transfers offered in the
second stage, q0(q | T). Finally, payments are made by the principals in accord with their
contractual obligations.
Our solution concept is pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria. We say that the strat-
egy profile {q0, t1, . . . , tn} is an equilibrium of the influence game if for all q 2 Q
(1) q0(q | T) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+ T(q),
and for all i 2 N
(2) ti 2 argmax
ti2T
Z
Q
 
siq0(q | T i + ti)  ti(q0(q | T i + ti))
 
f (q)dq.
For any aggregate equilibrium transfer function, T, we will refer to the equilibrium alloca-
tion pair, (q,U), as defined by q(q) ⌘ q0(q | T) and U(q) = S0(q(q))  qq(q) + T(q(q)) for
all q 2 Q.
3. PRELIMINARIES
We begin with a consideration of principal i’s best response under the belief that the
other principals will offer the aggregate influence schedule T i. From principal i’s van-
tage point, it is as if he is designing a contract for an agent with residual preferences given
by
S0(q)  qq+ T i(q).
Absent an agreement with principal i, the agent can always secure the following indirect
utility with the remaining n  1 principals:
U i(q) ⌘ max
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+ T i(q).
Note that if the agent is offered a nonnegative schedule by principal i, it necessarily fol-
lows that the agent’s indirect utility of contracting with principal i weakly exceeds U i.
type. Our main characterization theorem, for example, extends to this setting with additional notation and
treatment of additional special cases.
8Similarly, if the agent’s indirect utility exceeds U i, then the agent must choose an action
for which principal i has offered a positive payment. Hence, we can replace the require-
ment that ti   0 with the requirement that U   U i, where U is the agent’s utility when
contracting with all principals.
Framed in this manner, we can think of principal i as choosing an allocation (q,U) that
is individually rational and incentive compatible for the agent relative to some outside
option, U i. As is well known in the literature, these requirements can be expressed for-
mally as
(3) U(q)   U i(q), for all q 2 Q, (individual rationality)
(4) U(q) convex,  q(q) 2 ∂U(q), (incentive compatibility).
Here, we have chosen to state the incentive compatibility requirement in (4) using the
subdifferential ofU to allow for the possibility thatU may have points of non differentia-
bility.
Given the characterization of implementability, principal i’s problem of choosing an
optimal ti can be reformulated as choosing an allocation (q,U) (q : Q ! Q, Lebesgue
measurable, and U : Q! R, absolutely continuous) to solve the following program:
Program Pi: max
(q,U)
Z
Q
 
siq+ S0(q(q))  qq(q) + T i(q(q)) U(q)
 
f (q)dq,
subject to (3)-(4). If T i is known to be piecewise differentiable and the integrand is known
to be concave, we could apply standard optimal control results to obtain a characteri-
zation of the the optimal contract. Assuming that T i is continuous and almost every-
where differentiable, however, imposes an equilibrium refinement that we should make
explicit.6
6Note that in the above description of principal i’s program, we have implicitly allowed the principal
to resolve the agent’s indifference in her favor if the agent’s best-response set is multi-valued. Because
incentive compatibility requires that the agent’s indirect utility function is convex, however, and because a
convex function has at most a countable number of kinks, the set of types who do not have a unique optimal
choice is necessarily of measure zero. Thus, we may arbitrarily break ties in cases of agent-indifference
without any measurable impact on the best-responses of the players. We thank Thomas Mariotti for raising
this concern.
9To provide a general solution to principal i’s program that requires only that T i be
upper-semicontinuous, we utilize necessary and sufficient conditions for control pro-
grams with type-dependent participation constraints and possibly discontinuous objec-
tive functions that we have developed elsewhere (Martimort and Stole (2014)). Intuitively,
one can show that the solution to the program in which the objective function is replaced
with its concavification is also a solution to the original program. The concavification,
while continuous, is possibly nondifferentiable at points, and so tools from nonsmooth
optimal control are employed. These tools, fortunately, allow us to state necessary and
sufficient conditions using a distribution of Lagrange multipliers that is reminiscent of
Jullien (2000).7
Before presenting the solution to Principal i’s program, we introduce one remaining
piece of notation – the virtual marginal valuation of principal i:
(5) bi(q) ⌘
8>>>><>>>>:
max
n
si   F(q)f (q) , 0
o
i 2 A,
min
n
si +
1 F(q)
f (q) , 0
o
i 2 B.
Recall that our assumption on the distribution of types required that principal preferences
are not too strong relative to the agent heterogeneity. Formally, for each principal i, there
exists a qˆi 2 (q, q) such that qˆi is the largest (resp., smallest) type such that bi(q) = 0 for
i 2 B (resp., i 2 A).
We can now present the main building block of our analysis.
LEMMA 1 Given the aggregate transfer function, T i, and the agent’s corresponding outside
option, U i(q), the allocation (q,U) is a solution to Principal i’s program if and only if it satisfies
(3)-(4), and for almost every q 2 Q
(6) bi(q) = 0 () U(q) = U i(q),
7Jullien (2000) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for control problems with pure type-
dependent state constraints under the assumption that the objective function is continuous and piecewise
differentiable. Martimort and Stole (2014) demonstrate that a slight variation of Jullien’s conditions can be
applied to discontinuous models as well. It is worth noting that the simplicity of these conditions is a conse-
quence of the assumption that the objective function is linear in the state variable. Because the preferences
of the players are quasi linear in money, this assumption is satisfied in the present setting.
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(7) q(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q).
In words, the Lemma informs us that for any type for which bi(q) = 0, principal i finds
it optimal not to influence the agent’s choice. Indeed, the optimal transfer ti which imple-
ments (q,U) above will have the property that ti(q(q)) = 0 for all q such that bi(q) = 0.
For these types, we say that principal i is inactive. For any q for which principal i is active,
bi(q) > 0, we have U(q) > U i(q) and principal i offers a marginal payment given by
t0i(q(q)) = bi(q), wherever ti is differentiable, and (7) gives the solution to the agent’s
optimal choice program.
4. EQUILIBRIA
Our influence game is an aggregate game because – after reducing the agent’s choice
to the function q0(q|T) – principal i’s preferences over strategy profiles can be reduced
to preferences over ti and the aggregate T. Although the influence game has infinite-
dimensional strategies and incomplete information, it also has the convenient property
that it is quasi-linear in strategies (i.e., payoffs are linear in transfer functions), and so
following Martimort and Stole (2012), we can apply the aggregate concurrence principle,
in tandem with Lemma 1, to deduce an immediate necessary condition for the set of
equilibria. In the present context, this is done simply noting that qmust solve (7) for each
principal i. Hence, q must also maximize the sum of the objectives from these individual
programs:
q(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
Â
i2N
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q)(8)
= argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (b(q)  q) q+ (n  1)
 
S0(q)  qq+ T(q)
 
,
where T implements q and b(q) ⌘ Âi2N bi(q) is the aggregate virtual preferences of the
principals.
Because T appears in the objective in (8) and it must also implement q, this necessary
condition contains a fixed point: For a given T, there exists a q, which in turn must be
a solution to the program in (8). As we will demonstrate, there are generally an infinite
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number of solutions to this program. One solution, however, stands out for special con-
sideration. Define the allocation qQ as the unique solution to
(9) qQ(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (b(q)  q) q,
and denote TQ as the aggregate transfer function which implements qQ. Implementabil-
ity, in turn, implies that qQ also satisfies
(10) qQ(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+ TQ(q).
As a consequence, qQ maximizes any objective which is a linear combination of the max-
imands in programs (9) and (10), and therefore qQ is a solution to (8). Indeed, as we show
below in our main characterization result, qQ is an equilibrium allocation. It has the addi-
tional properties that it is continuous, strictly decreasing over any interval in which some
principal is active, and it is implemented by an almost everywhere differentiable aggre-
gate transfer function. That said, we emphasize that there are an infinity of solutions to (8)
that are equilibria but do not satisfy (9).8 Fortunately, all equilibria have a similar struc-
ture, which we now characterize in one of this paper’s main theoretical contributions.
THEOREM 1 If q is an equilibrium allocation, then
(11) q(q) 2 argmax
q2q(Q)
S0(q) + (b(q)  q)q, for all q 2 Q.
Moreover, the allocation qQ satisfying
(12) qQ(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (b(q)  q) q,
is an equilibrium allocation.
The difference between the two conditions is subtle, but significant. The sufficient con-
dition in (12) is stronger than the necessary condition (11) since it requires optimality over
the whole set of possible actions, Q; on the contrary, the necessary condition in (11) re-
quires optimality relative to the (typically) smaller range of equilibrium allocations, q(Q).
8Note that although any solution that satisfies (9) and (10) must also satisfy (8), there exist allocations
which satisfy (8) and (10), but fail to satisfy (9).
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It is for this reason that we denote the solution to (12) with a Q as superscript to indi-
cate the optimization is taken over the whole of Q rather than the equilibrium range,
q(Q) ✓ Q, and accordingly we will refer to such an equilibrium as maximal. We will
demonstrate below that there are equilibrium allocations which satisfy (11) but do not
satisfy (12), and so the latter condition implicitly refines the equilibrium set. When, for
instance, S0 is strictly concave, this restriction implies that q is in fact continuous. Instead,
condition (11) is a priori compatible with the existence of discontinuities in the output
profile. In fact, the equilibrium set is shown to contain an infinite number of discontinu-
ous equilibria.
Although the domains of optimization differ in (11) and (12), it is worth emphasizing
that the fundamental character of both conditions is similar. Theorem 1 makes it clear
that in any equilibrium – and in particular in the continuous maximal equilibrium – there
is an information-rent distortion generated by the presence of n principals each trading
off the cost of bilateral inefficiency against the gain of surplus extraction. The manner in
which these information-rent margins combine to generate departures from efficiency is
the same across all equilibria and involves the comparison of the principals’ collective
margins under full information,
Â
i2N
si
versus their collective virtual margins under incomplete information,
Â
i2A
max
⇢
si   F(q)f (q) , 0
 
+ Â
i2B
min
⇢
si +
1  F(q)
f (q)
, 0
 
.
This universal comparison is possibly the most compelling reason to refine the set of
equilibria and focus on qQ, although we remain largely agnostic. It is also worth noting
that although any equilibrium allocation q may differ from qQ, if for some q it is the case
that q(q) is fully separating over the neighborhood of q, then q and qQ must coincide.
Formally,
COROLLARY 1 For any equilibrium allocation, q, and for any q 2 Q,
q(q) 2 int q(Q) =) q(q) = qQ(q).
Hence, any differences between two equilibrium allocations arise at the boundaries of
the equilibrium range.
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Given the simplicity in computing maximal equilibrium allocations for applications,
we provide here a complete characterization of the corresponding maximal equilibrium
tariffs. The nature of these tariffs is established in the constructive proof to (12) in Theorem
1.
COROLLARY 2 The maximal equilibrium allocation
qQ(q) ⌘ argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (b(q)  q)q,
is supported by the continuous equilibrium tariffs which satisfy, for each i,
(a) tQi (q) = 0 if either q 62 qQ(Q), or q = qQ(q) and bi(q) = 0, and
(b) ddq t
Q
i (q) = bi(J
Q
(q)), where q = JQ(q) is the inverse of q = qQ(q).9
A typical feature of non-maximal equilibrium allocations are the presence of discon-
tinuities in q (or equivalently, gaps in the equilibrium range q(Q)) and the bunching of
types. For equilibrium allocations that are discontinuous, Theorem 1 imposes additional
structure for the points at which there must be bunching.
COROLLARY 3 If q is an equilibrium allocation with a discontinuity at q0, then
(13) S0(q1) + (b(q0)  q0)q1 = S0(q2) + (b(q0)  q0)q2,
where q1 = limq!q+0 q(q) and q2 = limq!q 0 q(q) > q1. Moreover, there exist q1 > q2 such that
q1 = qQ(q1) and q2 = qQ(q2), and
q(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
q1 = qQ(q1), for q 2 (q0, q1]
q2 = qQ(q2), for q 2 [q2, q0).
The above characterization bears strong similarities with the literature on mechanism
design without transfers in monopolistic screening environments.10 In that literature,
9This inverse is a priori a correspondence which is single-valued at any point where tQi (q) is differen-
tiable.
10See Holmstro¨m (1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Alonso and Matoushek (2008), and Martimort
and Semenov (2006), among others.
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much effort has been devoted to characterize possible actions implementable in a con-
text with asymmetric information when the preferences of the principal and the agent
differ. The basic lesson there is that any implementable action may either be flat over
some range and not responsive to the agent’s private information or correspond to the
latter’s ideal point. In light of this literature, everything happens as if, over a range Q,
the equilibrium output q were chosen by a surrogate principal who aggregates the be-
havior of all principals and maximizes their aggregate virtual surplus as defined in (11).
Of course, the objective of this surrogate principal differs from what would be optimal
had principals merged; the difference being related to the fact that in a non-cooperative
context, each principal introduces output distortions for rent extraction reasons.
We complete our equilibrium analysis in this section by demonstrating that one can
take any equilibrium allocation and add an additional discontinuity to create a new equi-
librium allocation, provided the discontinuity is not too large.
PROPOSITION 1 Let q be any equilibrium allocation and let (qˆ, qˆ) be any point on this allocation
around which there in an open neighborhood such that q is continuous, strictly decreasing, and
two or more principals are active. Then there exists an equilibrium allocation, q˜, whose range
corresponds to q, except for the an open neighborhood (q1, q2) containing qˆ:
(14) q˜(q) 2 argmax
q2Q\(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (b(q)  q)q.
In addition, every agent type weakly prefers the original equilibrium allocation, U(q)   U˜(q),
with strict preference for some positive measure of types.
The Proposition makes clear that an arbitrary number of discontinuities may be in-
troduced into any equilibrium allocation. We also show in the constructive proof to this
proposition that if types are uniformly distributed, the equilibrium tariffs which imple-
ment q˜ are simply t˜i(q) = 0 for q 2 (q1, q2) and t˜i(q) = ti(q) otherwise.11 In Section 5.2
we will explicitly construct such a discontinuous equilibrium in the context of a lobbying
game and demonstrate that even large gaps can be introduced.
11More generally, when types are not uniformly distributed, the constructed tariff for each active prin-
cipal i must have a change in constant at either q1 or q2, but the aggregate tariff still satisfies T˜(q) = 0 for
q 2 (q1, q2) and T˜(q) = T(q) otherwise.
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5. APPLICATIONS
We have chosen two classes of games to illustrate the equilibrium characterization in
Theorem 1 that we believe are of particular interest as applications. In the first section,
our focus is on settings in which all principals exhibit congruent preferences (e.g.,A = N
and B = ∆), and our particular application is the provision of a public good by citizen-
principals employing a privately informed agent-supplier. In the subsequent section, our
focus shifts to environments in which principals disagree about the preferred direction
of action, and we apply our framework to games in which principal-lobbyists attempt
to influence the policy choice of a privately informed agent-legislator. Our focus in both
games is primarily on the maximal equilibrium allocations, but as a comparison we also
characterize non-maximal equilibria in the context of the lobbying game.
5.1. Congruent Preferences – Private Provision of Public Goods
In the public-good game we consider, there are n principal-citizens and a privately-
informed supplier of a public good. Each principal values the public good, but the princi-
pals may differ in the intensities of their preferences. Formally, we order the n principals
such that s1   ...   sn > 0 and will denote a configuration of principal preferences by the
vector s ⌘ (s1, . . . , sn). Each principal offers the common agent a contribution schedule,
ti, which promises a payment ti(q) to the agent for q units of public good. We take the
domain of public goods to be Q = [0, qmax], with qmax larger than the first-best level of
public good, and for simplicity we assume that S0(0) = S00(0) = 0.
5.1.1. Properties of the maximal equilibrium allocation
Specializing (12) from Theorem 1 to the public goods setting, the maximal equilibrium
allocation satisfies
(15) qQ(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+
 
Â
i2N
max
⇢
si   F(q)f (q) , 0
 !
q.
There are two natural benchmarks for comparison. Under complete information, the first-
best, full-information allocation satisfies
q f b(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+
 
Â
i2N
si
!
q,
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and so we have the immediate (and familiar) result that the presence of incomplete infor-
mation results in a downward distortion in activity except at the most efficient type, q. In
the present setting, however, there are two distinct reasons for this downward distortion.
A second benchmark allows us to decompose this further. Suppose that there is a sin-
gle principal who has linear preferences for the public good given by Âi si; alternatively,
one can think of a cooperative formed with all principals designing their compensation
schedule tomaximize their collective surplus. In this case, the optimal allocation coincides
with familiar allocation of Baron and Myerson (1982) in which the government regulates
a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. Formally, the solution is
qbm(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+max
( 
Â
i2N
si
!
  F(q)
f (q)
, 0
)
q.
Close inspection reveals that
q f b(q)   qbm(q)   qQ(q)
for all q with strict inequality for a positive measure of types. The difference between the
first-best allocation and the Baron-Myerson solution is well understood as the outcome
of a tradeoff between surplus extraction and inefficient output. The additional down-
ward distortion between the Baron-Myerson allocation and the maximal allocation in the
non-cooperative game can be understood as a tragedy of the commons in which each
individual principal “over harvests” the agent’s information rent. This is clearest to see
when the principals have symmetric preferences, si = s for all i, and we further assume
that the principals are active for all types. In this case,
qbm(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + nsq  qq  F(q)f (q) q,
but in the noncooperative setting
qQ(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + nsq  qq  nF(q)f (q) q.
Evidently, the information-rent term is magnified by a factor of n as each principal at-
tempts to extract a margin of rents from the agent. The noncooperative public-goods
game induces an n-fold marginalization that is in the same spirit as the problem of double
marginalizations that arise in vertical sales relationships.
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It is worth noting that this over harvesting of the agent’s information rent disappears
as one takes the limit of the maximal allocation as information becomes complete. Unlike
the classic public-goods game which does not include a common agent and in which each
principal contributes a fixed level of output to the public good, under complete informa-
tion the presence of a common agent and the use of nonlinear prices allows the first-best
allocation to arise in equilibrium. The noncooperative nature of the game introduces ad-
ditional distortions only because of the presence of incomplete information. This is one of the
novel insights of our approach.
5.1.2. Comparison with Intrinsic Common-Agency Games
In this paper, we require that each principal offers nonnegative transfers to the agent,
which is formally equivalent to allowing the agent to accept only a subset of contract of-
fers. Elsewhere in Martimort and Stole (2012), we considered the simpler setting in which
the principals could offer negative transfers but the agent was restricted to either accept
or reject to entire set of offers. In this case of intrinsic common agency in which rejection
must be uniform across all principals, every principal is active for the same set of agent
types. Moreover, if the principals’ preferences are congruent, then the analogue of the
maximal equilibrium in the case of intrinsic common agency is
(16) qI(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+max
(
Â
i2N
✓
si   F(q)f (q)
◆
, 0
)
q.
Comparing (16) to (15), we see that the fact that only a subset of principals may be active
for a given type results in a higher (more efficient) level of activity compared to the game
in which the agent must either accept or reject the entire set of contract offers. In the case
of intrinsic common agency, if the agent is active, then the information term F(q)/ f (q)
necessarily has a weight of n attached to it, while in the case of our influence game in
which transfers are nonnegative, there may be a lower coefficient attached to the rent
term for some less-efficient types.
5.1.3. Comparative statics on principals’ preferences
The fact that the cooperative allocation is weakly higher than the noncooperative al-
location (and strict for some types) is actually a special case of a more general phenom-
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ena and follows from an application of Jensen’s inequality to the characterization in (15),
which is convex in the principals’ preference configuration.
PROPOSITION 2 In the public goods game, consider two configurations of principal preferences,
s = (s1, . . . , sn) and s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜n), where s˜ is a mean-preserving spread 12 of s. The associated
maximal allocations in each game have the property that for all q
qQs˜ (q)   qQs (q),
with a strict inequality for some positive measure.
As an illustration, consider the case of full principal integration; this is equivalent to
one principal having preferences s˜1 = Âi si and the other (n  1) principals having prefer-
ences s˜j = 0 for j 6= 1. It follows that s˜ is more disperse than s and therefore, from Propo-
sition 2, the Baron-Myerson outcome with a collective of principals generates a higher
allocation than in the noncooperative setting.
As another application, consider the case in which all of the principals are symmetric,
si = S/n, and the total marginal benefit is fixed independent of n. As one increases n, the
mean benefit is unchanged, but the dispersion of preferences increases.13 It follows that
an increase in n reduces public good provision. Indeed, using again (15) for this case, we
have
qQ(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+ n
✓
max
⇢
S
n
  F(q)
f (q)
, 0
 ◆
q,
which for n! • converges to
qQ(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq.
Thus, in the limit no public good is provided. Note that this asymptotic inefficiency result
arises from a very different source than the asymptotic inefficiency result in the public
goods game of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). In our setting, inefficiency arises because
12To be clear, given two configurations s and s˜ with the same mean (i.e., Âi si = Âi s˜i), we define the
associated discrete distributions on the combined domain [isi [j s˜j. If the distribution for s second-order
stochastically dominates the distribution for s˜, then we say that s˜ is a mean-preserving spread of s.
13To be precise, one should imagine a population of m > n principals exists for which n principals have
the preferences si = S/n and m  n principals have preferences si = 0. Now, as n increases toward m, the
profile of principals’ preferences increase in dispersion.
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each principal attempts to extract the agent’s marginal rent, ignoring the externality this
has on the others; in Mailath and Postewaite’s setting, each principal has private informa-
tion about their willingness to pay (the agent’s preferences are known), and the probabil-
ity that any individual principal is pivotal goes to zero as the number of players increases.
More generally, Proposition 2 makes clear that the equilibrium allocation is not invari-
ant with respect to redistributions of the principals’ preferences, keeping the aggregate
Âi si constant. Thus, a unit tax on principal 1’s use of the public good that is exactly off-
set by a unit subsidy on principal 2’s use could have a real impact on the equilibrium
allocation of public goods if this changed the set of active principals.14 The conduit for
how mean-preserving variations in the principals’ preferences can have real impacts in
the final allocation is reminiscent of findings in the public finance literature on voluntary
contribution games (see, e.g., Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), et al.). This literature,
which has focused on complete information games in which players’ strategies are scalar
contributions (as opposed to schedules of contributions), demonstrates that neutrality
arises in simple public goods games precisely when the set of contributors is unaffected
by a variation in preferences or incomes; when the set of contributors is affected, however,
the level of public good provision is typically altered. Similarly, we find in our richer
incomplete-information setting with a privately-informed agent that the key source of
non-neutrality is that an underlying variation can impact the set of principals who are
actively influencing some type.
In the context of interest groups, the finding in Proposition 2 formalizes the ideas of
Olson (1965) and Stigler (1974) that a group is more likely to be influential if the group’s
preferences are heterogeneous (e.g., a combination of small and large stakeholders, rather
than a group of equal stakeholders). This idea has also been formalized in a simple set-
ting of binary actions and preferences by LeBreton and Salanie´ (2003). The present paper
shows that this result remains prominent in a richer setting.
Another political effect noted by Olson (1965) is that an increase in the stake of one
interest group member raises that person’s contribution, possibly lowers the contribution
of others, but on net raises the total contribution (i.e., crowding out may arise, but it
14This is not the case in models of intrinsic common agency, as shown in Martimort and Stole (2012),
because in such games all principals are active on the same type set and the allocation is unchanged by
mean-preserving variations in the principals’ preferences.
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is never complete). We can find a similar result in the case of public goods where the
increase in stake is modeled by an increase in si, and we can ask what happens to the
maximal equilibrium allocation (and the marginal transfers of all principals) in this case.
PROPOSITION 3 In the public goods game, consider two principal preference configurations, s
and s˜, in which s˜i = si + Di, Di > 0, but s˜j = sj for j 6= i. Then the associated maximal
equilibrium allocations satisfy
qQs˜ (q)   qQs (q),
with strict inequality for some positive measure of types.
Furthermore, both the marginal aggregate payment function and the marginal payment function
of principal i weakly increase over the set of equilibrium choices (and strictly so for a subset of
outputs), while the marginal payment functions of the other principals, j 6= i, weakly decrease
over the set of equilibrium choices (and strictly so for a subset of outputs). Crowd out is less than
perfect.
This result follows directly from an application of (15): Because qQ(q) is weakly increas-
ing in si (and strictly increasing in si for some positive measure of types), it follows that
the maximal equilibrium allocation must weakly increase (strictly over the same measure
of types). Hence, the aggregate marginal contribution schedule, TQ0(q), cannot decrease
for any q 2 qQ(Q) and must strictly increase for at least some range of q that are chosen
in equilibrium by the agent. Next consider the marginal payments made by principals
j 6= i (whose stakes have remained constant). From Corollary 2, the marginal transfer of
principal j is given by
tQj 0(q) = bi(J(q)) = max
(
sj   F(J(q))f (J(q)) , 0
)
,
where q = J(q) is the inverse function of q = qQ(q) and is uniquely defined at every
point of differentiability of tQj (q). For any region of types for which qQ is decreasing and
strictly higher, it follows that J(q) is also decreasing and strictly higher. From themarginal
payment equation, tQj 0(q)must be lower following the change in principal i’s preferences
for these q. Of course, we know that TQ0(q) is strictly higher for this q, so it follows that
tQi 0(q) must be increase more than the reduction of Âj t
Q
j
0(q). Hence, crowd out occurs,
but it is less than perfect.
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5.1.4. A worked example
We conclude our study of the public goods game with a worked example to illustrate
the properties of the maximal equilibrium. To this end, we assume that n = 2, S0(q) =
  12q2, Q = [0, qmax] with qmax sufficiently large15, and that q is distributed uniformly
on [0, q]. As benchmarks, the efficient output is q f b(q) = max{s1 + s2   q, 0}, and the
cooperative Baron-Myerson allocation is qbm(q) = max{s1 + s2   2q, 0}. We use (15) to
obtain a closed-form solution for the maximal allocation:
qQ(q) = max
(
2
Â
i=1
max
⇢
si   F(q)f (q) , 0
 
  q, 0
)
.
In our setting with n = 2, we can alternatively characterize qQ as the pointwise maximum
of
q1(q) ⌘ max
⇢
s1   q   F(q)f (q) , 0
 
,
q2(q) ⌘ max
⇢
s2   q   F(q)f (q) , 0
 
,
and
q{1,2}(q) ⌘ max
⇢
s1 + s2   q   2F(q)f (q) , 0
 
,
where we can think of qi as the allocation that principal i would implement in isolation,
and q{1,2} as the allocation that arises whenever principals 1 and 2 are both actively influ-
encing the agent with double marginalizations. Thus,
q f b(q)   qbm(q)   max{q1, q2, q{1,2}} = qQ(q).
An illustration makes clear these orderings.
15It suffices that qmax    q +Âi2N si to prevent bunching at qmax.
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qbm( )
qfb( )qQ( )
q1( )
q{1,2}( )
q
 
Figure 1: Voluntary provision of a public good. Figure is drawn for the case of q uniformly
distributed on [0, 52 ], s1 =
7
2 > s2 =
3
4 , and S0(q) =   12q2.
This example illustrates how distortions in delegated common agency games with con-
gruent principals manifest themselves in two dimensions. First, because each active prin-
cipal contributes less than his marginal valuation, inefficient provision arises at the in-
tensive margin arises. The equilibrium output is lower than the cooperative solution and
features the same two-fold distortion that is present in intrinsic common-agency games. A
second distortion, novel to delegated agency games, emerges from limited participation
by the weaker principal; output is also distorted at the extensive margin. In this example,
there exists a non-empty interval of types, s2  F(q)f (q)  s1, such that only principal 1 is
active under asymmetric information while both principals would be active as a cooper-
ative or if information was complete.
The fact that output is inefficiently low in the noncooperative setting relative to the
cooperative Baron-Myerson outcome may suggest that the familiar free-riding problem
in classic public-goods contributions games is also present in public-goods games with
more complex strategy spaces. While this is true in a sense, we again emphasize that
the source of this multi-principal problem is incomplete information. If information were
complete (which is tantamount to eliminating the inverse-hazard terms from the equa-
tion), the maximal equilibrium leads to full efficiency: each principal offers the marginal
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tariff t0i(q) = si. This is the same efficient equilibrium outcome that arises in Bernheim and
Whinston’s (1986) “truthful equilibrium.” Thus, free riding need not arise in complete-
information public-goods games if the principals have the ability to offer nonlinear tariffs
to a common agent rather than making direct, one-dimensional contributions to the pub-
lic good. When incomplete information is present, however, each principal has a private
incentive to distort the agent’s output choice to extract additional information rent. Be-
cause each principal ignores the negative externality that this imposes on others, from a
collective viewpoint, the principals inefficiently extract too much rent. The public goods
free-riding problem present in our setting more closely fits the narrative of a “tragedy of
the commons” in which each principal over harvests the common resource – the agent’s
information rent.
Another interpretation of the limited participation that may arise under asymmetric
information is that some form of exclusive contracting emerges endogenously even if ex-
clusivity clauses cannot be enforced at the outset. This is so even if both principals would
otherwise have contracted with the agent under complete information. This finding is
reminiscent of an important insight developed by Bernheim andWhinston (1998) in their
study of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers. They showed that
exclusive dealing in marketing practices arises when the agency costs of a common rep-
resentation are too large compared with those under exclusive dealing. There is, however,
an important difference between their result and ours. They assume that the possibility of
exclusive representation arises ex ante, i.e., before the realization of uncertainty. Although
their general contracting model is thus consistent with hidden actions or hidden informa-
tion, it cannot account with the possibility of exclusivity arising for some realization of
shocks and not for others. In this regard, our model, where contracting takes place once
the agent is already informed, generates richer patterns of behaviors.
5.2. Conflicting Preferences – Lobbying for Influence
We next turn to settings in which the principals can be divided into two “interest”
groups – A and B – with opposed objectives. In short, in games with conflicting pref-
erences, it is as if there are two influence groups, each composed of principals who are
contributing to the public good of their own group. Thus, previous results in the context
of public goods that illustrated how changes in preferences affect influence continue to
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hold provided the comparative static is taken over one group in isolation. In the present
section, we will see that there is an additional role of conflict between groups that gener-
ates non-nested sets of influence, and that an increase in dispersion across all principals
can easily generate an increased dispersion of policies relative to the first best.
5.2.1. A simple n = 2 model of conflict
We begin with the simplest setting of two principals with conflicting preferences s1 >
0 > s2. As a motivation, principal 1 prefers a higher tax rate, q, whereas principal 2 prefers
a lower tax rate. The decision-maker (agent) has some ideal policy he would like to pur-
sue in the absence of any influence by lobbying groups. For simplicity, we model these
preferences by taking S0(q) =   q
2
2 where q 2 Q = [ qmax, qmax] with qmax being large
enough to ensure interior solutions to (9) allowing us to focus on first-order conditions.
We will assume also that the agent’s ideal point q0(q) =  q is symmetrically distributed
over [ d, d] with d < 1.16 Choosing this bliss point gives a status quo payoff U0(q) = q22
to the agent.
5.2.2. The maximal allocation
Applying the general methodology developed in Theorem 1, we obtain:
PROPOSITION 4 The maximal equilibrium allocation of the lobbying game with s1 > 0 > s2 is
(17) qQ(q) = max
⇢
s1   F(q)f (q) , 0
 
+min
⇢
s2 +
1  F(q)
f (q)
, 0
 
  q,
and the equilibrium marginal tariffs are given by
(18) tQj 0(q) = bi(J(q)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
max
n
sj   F(J(q))f (J(q)) , 0
o
i 2 A,
max
n
sj   F(J(q))f (J(q)) , 0
o
i 2 B,
where q = J(q) is the inverse function of q = qQ(q).
If q is uniformly distributed, the activity sets of the principals are
(19) Q1 = [ d,min{s1   d, d}) and Q2 = (max{d+ s2, d}, d].
16Since principals are symmetrically biased in opposite directions, they would just agree on letting the
agent choose his status quo policy had they cooperated.
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If type heterogeneity is small relative to the strength of the principals’ preferences,
d <
s1 + |s2|
2
,
then the principals commonly influence a positive measure of intermediate-type agents; otherwise,
each principal has a separate domain of influence.
The lobbying model shows that decision-makers with mild preferences receive contri-
butions from both interest groups; unchallenged influence arises in our model endoge-
nously for the decision-makers who are the most “ideologically” oriented.17,18 This is, of
course, a much richer pattern of influence and contributions than what is predicted by
complete information lobbying games as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) or Dixit and
al. (1997). In those complete information models, group i enjoys exclusive influence on
policy only when other potential interest groups are just indifferent between that policy
induced by group i and other policies that they may induce with positive contributions.
Moreover, the absence of heterogeneity in the decision-maker’s preferences in those mod-
els makes it impossible to generate different patterns of contributions and thus it remains
a puzzle in that literature as to why some groups target some legislators and not others.
17Martimort and Semenov (2008) derive further results on the patterns of contributions in a lobbying
game with a different objective function for the agent.
18Such a finding is loosely consistent with empirical work by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) who docu-
ment situations in which political action committees (PACs) representing rival constituents in the financial
services industry contribute similar amounts to the same legislators, providing that they are not on the
House Banking Committee. For members of the House Banking Committee, however, rival PACs tend not
to match each others’ contributions. Indeed, commercial-bank PAC contributions are negatively correlated
with contributions from securities and insurance PACs, though this correlation is statistically insignificant.
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Figure 2: Maximal equilibrium allocation in a symmetric lobbying game, s1 =  s2 = 1, with
d 2 ( 12 , 1). Common influence arises for types q 2 (d  1, 1  d).
5.2.3. A competitive nonlinear pricing reinterpretation
Interestingly, the lobbying model can be transposed mutatis mutandis to an industrial
organization setting to study how a consumer having private information on his most
preferred bundle mixes between two goods marketed by two competing sellers. Suppose
that this consumer wants to acquire one unit of a homogenous good and is located at a
point q 2 [0, 1] on a unit line, with one seller’s product being located at each extreme.
The consumer has a valuation v for the good and incurs a quadratic loss of   12(q   q)2
when consuming something that differs from his ideal of q0(q) = q from principal 1
and 1  q0(q) from principal 2. Up to some normalizations, the consumer and the sell-
ers’ profits are similar to those of the lobbying model above when the sellers’ marginal
costs are constant. Our previous results can be reinterpreted as giving conditions under
which a share of the market is always covered by both sellers. When type-heterogeneity
is sufficiently high, mixed bundling arises and global exclusivity cannot be an equilib-
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rium. Hoernig and Valletti (2011) have independently derived a similar insight but, at the
outset, restricted their analysis to smooth tariffs. As we will see below when studying
discontinuous equilibria in the (similar) lobbying game, this restriction may indeed be
justified because such smooth equilibrium may have attractive welfare properties among
a much larger class of equilibria allowing for discontinuities. Nevertheless, there are dis-
continuous equilibria worth consideration. The approach in the present paper can also be
applied to the more general issue of firms offering discounts to their customers based on
their consumption mix, as in the recent debate over Intel’s use of market-share discounts
with electronics manufacturers who are also (potential) customers of AMD.19
5.2.4. Discontinuous equilibria in the lobbying game.
In the lobbying context, we establish the existence of discontinuous equilibria by apply-
ing the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 1 to construct arbitrary discontinuous
allocations and then verifying that they are supported by equilibrium transfer functions.
To this end, we assume a uniform and symmetric distribution around zero, and we intro-
duce a single discontinuity to the maximal (continuous) allocation at q = 0. The following
proposition provides an exact upper bound on the size of the equilibrium discontinuity;
this bound makes clear that such discontinuity gaps may be significant.
PROPOSITION 5 Suppose that s1 =  s2 = 1 < 2d, S0(q) =   q
2
2 and that q is uniformly
distributed on Q = [ d, d]. For any q0 2 (0, (1   d)
p
3], there exists an equilibrium with
a discontinuity at q0 = 0 and such that q(0 ) =  q(0+) = q0. Both the agent’s rent and
the principals’ expected payoffs in such discontinuous equilibria are lower than at the maximal
equilibrium.
In the proof of Proposition 5, we provide a construction of the tariffs supporting the
discontinuous allocation and show that indeed the tariffs comprise an equilibrium to the
common-agency game. The tariffs have a very natural structure. If tQi is principal i’s equi-
librium tariff in the maximal equilibrium, and if the hypotheses of Proposition 5 are sat-
19Calzolari and Denicolo (2013) study a market-discount game and characterize one differentiable equi-
librium in which the firms coordinate on extracting the customer’s preference for variety; a general analysis
of the larger set of equilibria is not undertaken. As in our analysis, the presence of two firms trying to extract
the information rent of the consumer leads to greater distortions in consumption.
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isfied, then the modified tariffs
ti(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for q 2 ( q0, q0),
tQi (q) otherwise,
support the discontinuous equilibrium.
To sustain those equilibria, principals design their contracts with “non-serious” out-of-
equilibrium offers. For instance, principal 2 stipulates zero payments for outputs within
the discontinuity gap [q(q+0 ), q(q
 
0 )] which are such that principal 1 is just indifferent to
inducing the agent with type q0 to produce any output within that range. This construc-
tion makes it possible to sustain the discontinuity in the agent’s choice.20 Importantly, we
demonstrate in the Appendix that a discontinuity can only be sustained if the equilibrium
schedules lie below the maximal ones on the discontinuity gap. On the range of equilib-
rium outputs corresponding to those discontinuous equilibria, principals offer schedules
which have the same margin as the maximal equilibria. So doing ensures that the agent
still chooses the maximal output on any connected set in that range.
Consider our previous example of a symmetric lobbying game. One such discontinuous
equilibriumwhich has a natural appeal exhibits extreme polarization: both lobbyists offer
sufficiently strong incentives for their own cause such that no politician chooses an action
in the middle of the policy space.
20By the same token, such construction could be replicated to sustain equilibria with multiple disconti-
nuities.
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Figure 3:Discontinuous, “polarized” equilibrium in a symmetric lobbying game with s1= s2=
1, d 2 ( 12 , 1). Moderate policies, q 2 ( (1  d)
p
3, (1  d)p3), are not chosen.
The comparison of the players’ payoffs across equilibria in the lobbying context shows
that the maximal equilibrium Pareto dominates, making it of focal interest. Not only the
agent but also principals lose from coordinating on a discontinuous equilibrium. From
Proposition 1, this result is clear for the agent since aggregate payments in those discon-
tinuous equilibria are lower than at the maximal one. To explain the principals’ prefer-
ences, observe that not paying the agent for policy choice within the discontinuity gap
has two effects. First, it increases polarization since types nearby the discontinuity now
pool at the boundaries of that discontinuity gap. This corresponds to more extreme poli-
cies than under the maximal equilibrium. Because principals have opposite preferences,
this reallocation effect has no impact on their aggregate gross surplus. Second, those types
who pool on decisions on each side of the policy gap end up being paid excessively com-
pared with the maximal equilibrium. This is costly for the principals. That said, the po-
larization that arises in the discontinuous equilibrium does not seem inappropriate as a
model of political lobbying. The fact that the equilibrium is inefficient relative to the max-
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imal allocation does not persuade us to reject its relevance a priori. Indeed, experimental
work by Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) is suggestive that in complete information settings,
the truthful (and efficient) equilibrium is not typically played and that instead a polar-
ized, “natural”equilibrium is more focal for players, even though it is not as efficient.
Our discontinuous equilibrium allocation has the flavor of the natural equilibrium in the
complete information game.
5.2.5. The impact of preference dispersion in lobbying games.
The final issue we wish to address is the effect of a mean-preserving spread in principal
preferences on the distribution of policies in our original framework of an arbitrary num-
ber of n principals (rather than n = 2). We maintain our assumption that S0(q) =   12q2,
though the results below will generalize to any symmetric benefit function for the agent.
For any configuration of principal preferences, we again order the preferences from high-
est to lowest, s1   · · ·   sk > 0 > sk+1   · · ·   sn, where A = {1, . . . , k} and
B = {k+ 1, . . . , n}. With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote s = (sA, sB) to high-
light the two separate vector components. The argument establishing our previous result
in Proposition 2 directly extends to questions of preferences changes within one of the
groups, A or B, while holding the preferences of the other group fixed.
PROPOSITION 6 Consider two configurations of principal preferences, s = (sA, sB) and s˜ =
(s˜A, s˜B). If s˜A is a mean-preserving spread of sA and s˜B = sB, then the associated maximal
allocations in each game have the property that for all q
qQs˜ (q)   qQs (q),
with a strict inequality for some positive measure. Similarly, if s˜A = sA and s˜B is a mean-
preserving spread of sB, then
qQs˜ (q)  qQs (q),
with a strict inequality for some positive measure.
We may immediately conclude that if the stakes of the players in group A, for exam-
ple, become more disperse, the equilibrium influence of group A on the distribution of
policy increases to the detriment of group B. More generally, more heterogeneous groups
(holding mean preferences constant) have more influence.
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Our result in Proposition 3 also has an immediate generalization that provides insight
for the lobbying game. Suppose that some principal i 2 A has an increased stake, but
all remaining principals continue with the same stakes as before. Then it follows that qQ
must weakly increase pointwise (in accord with the positive objectives of group A), and
this happens in spite of crowd out of contributions from other principals j 6= i, j 2 A and
in spite of reduced marginal contributions by principals j 2 B in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 7 Consider two principal preference configurations, s and s˜, in which s˜i = si +
D, D > 0, but s˜j = sj for j 6= i. Then if i 2 A (resp., i 2 B), the associated maximal equilibrium
allocations satisfy
qQs˜ (q)   (resp.,) qQs (q),
with strict inequality for some positive measure of types.
Furthermore, if i 2 A (resp., i 2 B) both the marginal aggregate payment function and the
marginal payment function of principal i weakly increase (resp., decrease) over the set of equilib-
rium choices (and strictly so for a subset of outputs), while the marginal payment functions of the
other principals, j 6= i, weakly decrease (resp., increase) over the set of equilibrium choices (and
strictly so for a subset of outputs). Crowd out is less than perfect.
We want to conclude our analysis of dispersion by considering the effects of an in-
crease in preference heterogeneity across all principals (not just within influence groups).
In order to generate crisp predictions, we restrict our attention to situations in which the
opposing interest groups are symmetric. Specifically, we assume that S0 is a symmetric
loss function around q = 0, that the density of types, f , is symmetric on Q = [ d, d],
and that the principals’ preference configuration is symmetric between interest groups, sA =
(s1, . . . , sk) and sB = ( s1, . . . , sk). We have reordered the preferences of B ranging from
largest in absolute value to smallest in absolute value, so that we can speak of the ith pair
of principals to mean the pair in which i 2 A has preference si and i 2 B has prefer-
ence  si. Observe, however, that we allow for arbitrary heterogeneity within groups. As
a benchmark, note that under this symmetric specification of the influence game, aggre-
gate principal preferences are zero and the first best policy outcome is q f b(q) =  q.
We consider a special form of a mean-preserving spread which preserves the original
symmetry between interest groups so that s˜A =  s˜B. In particular, we say that s˜ is a pair-
wise mean-preserving spread if there exists a vector of positive increments, D = (D1, . . . ,Dk)
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such that s˜A = sA + D and s˜B = sB   D.21 For a given configuration of preferences, s, we
can compute the maximal allocation qQs , and the implied distribution of policy choices:
G(q | s) ⌘ Probq
h
qQs (q)  q
i
,
The following result is derived from (9).
PROPOSITION 8 Consider two configurations of principal preferences, s and s˜, which are sym-
metric between interest groups. If s˜ is a pairwise mean-preserving spread of s, then G(q | s˜) is a
mean-preserving spread of G(q | s).
In general, a symmetric mean-preserving spread applied to a preference configuration
that is itself symmetric between interest groups results in an increase in the dispersion
of policy outcomes. As a reference point, notice that the distribution of first-best policies
depends only upon the aggregate preferences of the principals and, therefore, is invariant
to mean-preserving spreads. In our particular setting in which q f b(q) =  q, the first-best
distribution is simply Gfb(q) = 1  F( q).
To illustrate this phenomena, consider a simple stylized setting for n = 2, symmetric
preferences s1 =  s2 = s and q uniformly distributed on [ d, d] as before. For any pref-
erence parameter s, we can determine qQs and, in tandem with the original distribution
over types q, construct the implied equilibrium distribution of policies, G(q|s), and its as-
sociated density, g(q | s). Below, we plot the density g(q|s) for various values of s and also
plot the first-best distribution of policies, which coincides with the uniform distribution
of q.
21Technically, we have assumed a special case of a symmetric mean-preserving spread in that we require
that the spread can be decomposed as k separate pairwise spreads. This makes the proof of Proposition 8
straightforward. We conjecture that a more general result is available for any symmetric, mean-preserving
spread.
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g(q|s = 2 )
g(q|s = 32 )
gfb(q) gfb(q)
gfb(q) gfb(q)
q =    q =   q =    q =  
q =    q =   q =    q =  
g(q|s =  )g(q | s = 12 )
Figure 4: Equilibrium probability distributions of policies. g f b(q) is the probability density of
the first-best policies; g(q | s) is the equilibrium density of (maximal) equilibrium policies, where
s varies from least-dispersed preferences, s = 12d (exclusive spheres of influence), to most dis-
persed preferences at s = 2d (both principals actively influence all types).
In accord with the proposition, the greater the dispersion in preferences, the more dis-
perse the distribution of policies.22
6. CONCLUSION
We have taken a large class of influence games with a privately-informed agent and
shown a common feature of all equilibria is a confluence of the principals’ marginal vir-
tual valuations. If one is prepared to focus on maximal equilibria, their properties can
easily be computed and comparative statics on underlying preferences yield a rich set of
predictive relationships. One goal for this paper was to illustrate the simplicity of using
22 McCarty, et al. (2006) have documented a strong correlation between increased campaign contributions
and political polarization. In particular, contributors with extreme conservative or liberal preferences gave
a disproportionately large share of the increased soft money allocated to congressional elections over the
period 1982-2002. In the context of the lobbying model, such a finding can be generated with either an
increase in the dispersion of preferences among contributors or, equivalently, with an increase in the value
of a dollar to legislators relative to the value of the contributors.
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the influence game with incomplete information, especially if one is prepared to impose
the refinement of maximal equilibria. To this end, we have focused on two work horses
– public goods games and lobbying games – but other applications such as nonlinear
pricing are equally natural in this framework.
Of course, discontinuous equilibria also exist, but they are also straightforward to com-
pute (once an assumption is made about where the discontinuities arise). The polarization
in the discontinuous equilibrium of the lobbying game – though inefficient relative to the
maximal equilibrium from the view of every player – has its own appeal and may nat-
urally arise for similar reasons as the “natural” equilibrium in the experiments of Kirch-
steiger and Prat (2001). For now, we remain agnostic about the selection of equilibria.
The class of influence games in this paper was chosen to be as large as possible while
still allowing for powerful characterizations. We should note, however, that a limitation
of our framework is our assumption that each principal has linear preferences over q.
This can be relaxed under some stronger assumptions on the type distribution (as we
noted in an earlier version of this paper, Martimort and Stole (2013)), but with consid-
erable technical difficulty. The restriction that q is one dimensional, we conjecture, is a
much less important assumption if one is willing to focus on continuous equilibria (a
variation of maximal equilibria) and focus attention on characterizing the information-
rent distortions. We leave the multi-dimensional generalization of the present setting to
future work.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
The proof of Lemma 1 proceeds in three steps. First, using a result in Martimort and Stole (2014),
we provide a set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the solution to principal i’s
relaxed program (ignoring the convexity constraint on U). Second, we demonstrate the adjoint
equations in these conditions can be further simplified given that the principal’s preferences are
linear in q. Third, we show that the solution to the relaxed and simplified program is a solution to
the original program.
STEP 1: THE RELAXED PROGRAM. Consider the relaxed program, (P ri ), that ignores the convexity
constraint in (4):
(P ri ) : max
(U,q)
Z
Q
 
siq(q) + S0(q(q)) + T i(q(q))  qq(q) U(q)
 
f (q)dq
subject to U(q)   U i(q) and  q(q) 2 ∂U(q) for all q.
We rewrite this program using a change of variables in order to get it into a more useful format
for applying a result from non-smooth control. Specifically, define the net utility that principal i’s
contract provides to the agent: Di(q) = U(q) U i(q). It follows that, a.e., q i(q)  q(q) 2 ∂Di(q)
for q i(q) 2 argmaxq2Q S0(q)  qq+ T i(q).
We use Di as the state variable and q(q)  q i(q) as the control variable in our new optimal con-
trol problem. Because q i(q) is data to this given program, q(q) is effectively the control variable
of principal i. Now we can state principal i’s relaxed program in net payoffs as
max
(Di ,q)
Z
Q
 
si(q(q) q i(q)) + S0(q(q)) + T i(q(q))  qq(q) U i(q)  Di(q)
 
f (q)dq
subject to q(q)  q i(q) 2  ∂Di(q), Di(q)   0.
We apply Theorem 1 from Martimort and Stole (2014) and conclude that for any transfer T i
offered by rival principals, the rent-output profile (U, q) is a solution to (P ri ) if and only if (U, q)
satisfies U(q)   U i(q) and  q(q) 2 ∂U(q) for all q, and there exists a probability measure µi
defined over the Borel subsets of Q with an associated adjoint function, Mi : Q ! [0, 1], defined
by Mi(q) = 0 and for q > q,
Mi(q) ⌘
Z
[q,q)
µi(dq),
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(20) supp {µi} ✓
 
q |U(q) = U i(q)
 
,
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(21) q(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
siq+ S0(q) + T i(q) +
✓
Mi(q)  F(q)
f (q)
  q
◆
q, a.e.
STEP 2: CHARACTERIZATION OF ADJOINT, Mi . We prove the following simplifying lemma.
LEMMA 2 In the linear common-agency game, if (q,U) is an equilibrium allocation, then for each princi-
pal i, (q,U) satisfies conditions (20) and (21) using the adjoint function
(22) Mi(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
max{F(q)  si f (q), 0}, i 2 A, 8 q 2 (q, q],
min{F(q)  si f (q), 1}, i 2 B, 8 q 2 (q, q],
such that Mi(q) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:We present the proof for i 2 A; the case for i 2 B proceeds accordingly.
1. Define qˆi as the unique solution to si f (qˆi) = F(qˆi). Two properties are immediately implied
for the region (qˆi, q]. First, the monotone hazard rate property implies that
(qˆi, q] = {q | F(q)  si f (q) > 0}.
Moreover, the slope of F(q)  si f (q) is positive if f (q) > si f 0(q); because the monotone haz-
ard rate condition also requires f 0(q)/ f (q)  f (q)/F(q), it follows that F  si f is increasing
if F(q)/ f (q) > si. We conclude a second property of (qˆi, q] is that F(q)   si f (q) is strictly
increasing on this interval.
2. We next show that the set of types for whom principal i is active (i.e., U(q) > U i(q)) is a
lower interval, Qi = [q, q0) where q0  qˆi.
Suppose that on [q0, q1] ✓ intQ we have U(q) = U i(q), but for # > 0 sufficiently small we
have U(q) > U i(q) on the adjacent neighborhoods, q 2 (q0   #, q0) [ (q1, q1 + #). Because
U(q) > U i(q) on (q1, q1 + #) and those rent functions are continuous, convex with q(q1) 2
∂U(q1) and q i(q1) 2 ∂U i(q1), it must be that q(q) < q i(q) on this region for # sufficiently
small. For this inequality to be satisfied, (21) requires that Mi(q) < F(q)   si f (q) for all
q 2 (q1, q1 + #). Because the participation constraint is slack on (q1, q1 + #), Mi(q) is constant
equal to Mi(q1), and we have also Mi(q1) < F(q)   si f (q). Because Mi(q)   0, it follows
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that F(q)  si f (q) > 0 on this interval which implies q1   qˆi. Because F   si f is increasing
for all q > qˆi, we can also conclude that
(23) si f (q) + Mi(q1)  F(q)  si f (q1) + Mi(q1)  F(q1) < 0 8q 2 (q1, q].
Suppose now that the participation constraint is binding on a second interval [q2, q3] (possi-
bly reduced to a point) with e small enough so that q1 + e < q2   e. On the interval (q1, q2),
the fact that the participation constraint remains slack implies that Mi(q) = Mi(q1) on that
interval. Because the participation constraint binds at q2, it must be that q(q) > q i(q) on
(q2   e, q2) which, using (21), would mean si f (q) + Mi(q1)   F(q) > 0 on that interval. A
contradiction with (23). Thus, there is at most one region of binding participation, [q0, q1].
Suppose now that the participation constraint is binding on [q0, q1], q1 < q and the partic-
ipation constraint is slack in the right-neighborhood of q1. Because U and U i are convex
functions andU i is a lower envelope ofU on [q0, q1], it follows that there is a neighborhood,
(q1, q1 + #) such that q(q) < q i(q) for all q 2 (q1, q1 + #) for # > 0 sufficiently small.
Suppose that principal i uses ti to implement the conjectured equilibrium allocation. Then
there exists a variation of this transfer, t˜i that creates a strict improvement. Define
t˜i(q) =
8><>:max{ti(q)  h, 0} if q  q i(q1)ti(q) otherwise.
We take h > 0 sufficiently small such that the allocation becomes q˜(q) = q i(q) for all
q 2 (q1, q1 + #) and q˜(q) = q(q) otherwise. The principal first gains from increasing quantity
over q 2 (q1, q1 + #) and not paying anything for that but he also gains from reducing
payments by h for all q  q i(q1).
Therefore, we conclude that the participation constraint U(q)   U i(q) is binding on an
interval
⇥
q0, q
⇤
.
3. Because the activity set is of the form [q, q0), (21) implies Mi(q) = 0 on that interval.
4. We now establish that q0  qˆi.
Because the activity set is of the form [q, q0), U(q)   U i(q) and thus necessarily q(q) >
q i(q) for q 2 (q0   #, q0) for # small enough. Moreover, the structure of the activity set
implies that Mi(q) = 0 on that interval.
Note also that over such interval, it is almost surely true that q i(q) is the unique maximizer
of S0(q) + T i(q)  qq; this is because the convexity of U i implies that almost everywhere
the best-response correspondence q i(q) = ∂U i(q) is single-valued.
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Using (21) and from the previous item Mi(q) = 0 on (q0   #, q0), we thus get for such q :✓
si   F(q)f (q)
◆
(q(q)  q i(q))  
S0(q i(q)) + T i(q i(q))  qq i(q) 
 
S0(q) + T i(q)  qq
    0
where the last inequality follows from the definition of q i(q). Thus✓
si   F(q)f (q)
◆
(q(q)  q i(q))   0
where the last inequality follows from the definition of q i(q). Furthermore, the last inequal-
ity is thus strict almost everywhere on (q0   #, q0). Thus, we deduce that 0 > F(q)  si f (q)
almost everywhere on that interval and therefore by continuity everywhere. Thus, we con-
clude that 0   F(q0)  si f (q0) and thus q0  qˆi.
5. We have now established that qˆi lies in the inactive region
⇥
q0, q
⇤
. On
⇥
qˆi, q
⇤
, we may as well
choose Mi(q) = F(q)  si f (q). This choice of the adjoint function indeed satisfies conditions
(20) (from item 1. Mi(q) is increasing over
⇥
qˆi, q
⇤
) and (21).
We next characterize Mi over the (possibly empty interior) interval [q0, qˆi)where q0 < qˆi. An
implication of (21) is that there exists an adjoint Mi(q) such that:
si +
Mi(q)  F(q)
f (q)
2 ∂co{S0(q i(q)) + T i(q i(q))  qq i(q)}.
Because Mi   0 and q < qˆi, over the interval [q0, qˆi), we have
si +
Mi(q)  F(q)
f (q)
> 0.
Moreover, by definition of q i(q), we have also:
0 2 ∂co{S0(q i(q)) + T i(q i(q))  qq i(q)}.
Because ∂co{S0(q i(q)) + T i(q i(q))   qq i(q)} is an interval and thus convex, si   F(q)f (q)
which is a convex combination of si +
Mi(q) F(q)
f (q) and 0 also satisfies:
si   F(q)f (q) 2 ∂co{S0(q i(q)) + T i(q i(q))  qq i(q)}.
In other words, there would be no loss of generality in taking Mi(q) = 0 over the inter-
val [q0, qˆi). We have now completely characterized the adjoint as in Lemma 2. (Incidentally,
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because ∂co{S0(q i(q)) + T i(q i(q))  qq i(q)} is almost everywhere single-valued, it fol-
lows that si +
Mi(q) F(q)
f (q) = 0, which implies that Mi(q) has to be a negative number, a con-
tradiction to the existence of q0 < qˆi.) ⇤
STEP 3: THE SOLUTION TO THE RELAXED PROGRAM IS CONVEX. What remains is to demonstrate
that the solution q to the relaxed program is weakly decreasing (equivalently, that U is convex).
Given Lemma 2, we can replace (20) and (21) with the conditions (6) and (7). The latter requires
that
q(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q).
Given that bi(q)  q is strictly decreasing in q, it follows that q is weakly decreasing in q for any
upper semi-continuous T i. Hence, the solution to the relaxed program is a solution to the original
program. ⇤
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
NECESSITY. Lemma 1 must hold for any equilibrium allocation. Adding up (7) across all n princi-
pals, we obtain the condition, for almost every q, the allocation satisfies
(24) q(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (b(q)  q)q+ (n  1)(S0(q)  qq+ T(q)),
where T implements (q,U). Simple revealed preference arguments show that q(q) is necessarily
non-decreasing since b(q)  q is itself non-increasing.
Define the value function of this program by
V(q) ⌘ max
q2Q
S0(q) + (b(q)  q)q+ (n  1)(S0(q)  qq+ T(q)).
From the fact that the maximand above is absolutely continuous in q, upper semi-continuous in q
and Q is compact, it follows that V(q) is absolutely continuous. Moreover, given that (q,U) is an
incentive-compatible allocation which solves this program,
V(q) = S0(q(q)) + (b(q)  q)q(q) + (n  1)U¯(q).
Because V is absolutely continuous, it is almost everywhere differentiable and for any pair (q, q0),
V(q) V(q0) =
Z q
q0
(b0(x)  n)q(x)dx.
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Because U is implementable, it is absolutely continuous and therefore for any pair (q, q0) we have
U(q) U(q0) =  
Z q
q0
q(x)dx.
Note that
S0(q(q)) + (b(q)  q)q(q) 
⇥
S0(q(q0)) + (b(q0)  q0)q(q0)
⇤
= V(q)  V(q0)  (n  1) ⇥U(q) U(q0)⇤
or more simply
(25) S0(q(q)) + (b(q)  q)q(q) 
⇥
S0(q(q0)) + (b(q0)  q0)q(q0)
⇤
=
Z q
q0
(b0(x)  1)q(x)dx.
Using the relationship
((b(q)  q)  (b(q0)  q0))q(q0) =
Z q
q0
(b0(x)  1)q(q0)dx,
and the fact that b and q are both weakly non-increasing, we obtain:
S0(q(q)) + (b(q)  q)q(q) 
⇥
S0(q(q0)) + (b(q)  q)q(q0)
⇤
=
Z q
q0
(b0(x)  1)(q(x)  q(q0))dx   0.
Because any q0 2 q(Q) can be identified with some q0 2 Q, the inequality implies q(q) satisfies (11)
pointwise in q.
SUFFICIENCY. Suppose that qQ satisfies (12). Because b(q)  q is decreasing, qQ is non-increasing.
Define the inverse of qQ as the correspondence
J
Q
(q) ⌘
h
min{q|q = qQ(q)},max{q|q = qQ(q)}
i
.
Because qQ is non-increasing, this correspondence is monotone and almost everywhere single
valued. Abusing notations, we will use JQ(q) as an arbitrary non-increasing selection from this
correspondence when integrating.
We construct the individual tariffs of each principal i 2 N as follows:
tQi (q) =
Z q
qQ(qˆi)
bi(J
Q
(x))dx.
Note that tQi is nonnegative by construction and t
Q
i (q) = 0 for q = qQ(qˆi). Because bi and J
Q
(q)
are non-increasing mappings, each constructed tariff is convex by construction. Denote the aggre-
gates by TQ = Âi2N t
Q
i (q) and T
Q
 i = Âj 6=i t
Q
j (q). It follows that the aggregates are also convex.
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What remains to be shown is (i) the aggregate transfer T induces the agent to choose q, and (ii)
each principal i, facing the rivals’ aggregate T i, finds it optimal to implement q.
Incentive compatibility. Consider the agent’s problem when facing aggregate payment, TQ. For any
pair (q, q), the following conditions hold:
S0(qQ(q)) + T
Q
(qQ(q)) + (b(q)  q)qQ(q)   S0(q) + TQ(qQ(q)) + (b(q)  q)q
  S0(q) + TQ(q) + b(JQ(q))(qQ(q)  q) + (b(q)  q)q
where the first inequality follows from the definition of qQ(q) and the second uses the convexity
of TQ. Simplifying further, we obtain
S0(qQ(q)) + T
Q
(qQ(q))  qqQ(q)   S0(q) + TQ(q)  qq+
h
(b(J
Q
(q))  b(q))(qQ(q)  q)
i
.
Because b(JQ(q)) is non-increasing in q, the bracketed difference is always non-negative. Incen-
tive compatibility is implied, as desired.
Principals’ optimality. Consider principal i’s program in light of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2. qQ is an
optimal allocation for principal i if and only if
(26) qQ(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + T
Q
(q)  tQi (q) + (bi(q)  q)q, a.e.
Remember that each tariff tQi is convex and therefore T
Q
 i is convex. Now observe that for all pairs
(q, q), the following sequence of relationships holds:
S0(qQ(q)) + T
Q
 i(qQ(q)) + (bi(q)  q)qQ(q)
= S0(qQ(q)) + T
Q
 i(qQ(q)) + (b(q)  b i(q)  q)qQ(q)
  S0(q) + (b(q)  q)q+ TQ i(qQ(q))  b i(q)qQ(q)
  S0(q) + (b(q)  b i(q)  q)q+ TQ i(q) +
h
(b i(J(q))  b i(q))(qQ(q)  q)
i
= S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ TQ i(q) +
h
(b i(J(q))  b i(q))(qQ(q)  q)
i
  S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ TQ i(q).
Both of the equalities above follow from the definition of bi. The first inequality uses the fact that
qQ(q) solves (12), while the second inequality follows from the convexity of TQ i. The final inequal-
ity follows from the fact that, b(J(q)) is non-increasing in q, and therefore the bracketed difference
is always non-negative. This proves that (26) holds and that principal i desires to implement qQ
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when facing a rival aggregate of TQ i. Because t
Q
i is zero for qQ(qˆi), the constructed tariff t
Q
i is the
least-cost (nonnegative) transfer that accomplishes this end. ⇤
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3:
Let q0 be a point of discontinuity of q. Such point is isolated because q is non-increasing and
thus almost everywhere differentiable. Moreover q admits right- and left-hand side limits at q0,
denoted respectively by q(q+0 ) and q(q
 
0 ) with q being continuous and differentiable both on a
right- and a left-neighborhoods of q0. We also deduce from monotonicity that q(q 0 ) > q(q
+
0 ) by
incentive compatibility. The optimality conditions (11) at q0 imply that (13) must hold. Because
S0 is strictly concave, S0(q) + (b(q0)  q0)q has a unique maximum at qQ(q0), and we thus have
q(q 0 ) > q
Q(q0) > q(q+0 ).
It was established in the necessity proof of Theorem 1 that
S0(q(q)) + (b(q)  q)q(q) = V(q) + (n  1)U(q)
is absolutely continuous itself and thus almost everywhere differentiable. Using (25), the following
condition holds at any point of differentiability of q:
(27) q˙(q)
 
S00(q(q)) + b(q)  q
 
= 0.
From this, it follows that q˙(q) = 0 whenever q(q) 6= qQ(q) at a point of differentiability.
Using (27) on the right- and a left-neighborhoods of q0, we deduce that q˙(q) = 0 on such neigh-
borhoods. By assumption, q(Q) ⇢ qQ(Q). Therefore, there exist q1 and q2 such that q2 < q0 < q1
and q(q 0 ) = q
Q(q2) = q2 and q(q+0 ) = q
Q(q1) = q1. Because the allocation q must be non-
decreasing, it can only be constant on the whole intervals [q2, q0) and (q0, q1]. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
1. We shall prove this result by choosing an interval (q1, q2) containing qˆ and constructing
equilibrium tariffs (t˜1, . . . , t˜n) that induce the agent to select q˜.
In what follows, we choose the open interval (q1, q2) sufficiently small, q2   q1 = #, such
that each principal is either inactive for all q 2 (q1, q2) in the original allocation, or is active
over the entire interval, q 2 (q1, q2). By hypothesis, there are at least two active principals
over any sufficiently small interval (q1, q2). For any such interval, (q1, q2), define the corre-
sponding type interval (q2, q1) such that in the original allocation q1 = q(q1) and q2 = q(q2).
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By hypothesis, we can choose # sufficiently small such that q is continuous and strictly de-
creasing over (q2, q1). As a result, Theorem 1 provides that q(q) = qQ(q) for all q 2 (q2, q1).
Because q(q) = qQ(q) is strictly decreasing and continuous over the interval (q2, q1), Corol-
lary 2 implies that T i is differentiable on (q1, q2). From here, it follows that for each i 2 N,
for q 2 (q2, q1)
bi(q) = t
0
i(q(q)).
Using again the fact that q(q) = qQ(q) on (q2, q1), we can use the inverse function of qQ,
denoted JQ(q), and integrate to obtain the result
(28) ti(q2)  ti(q1) =
Z q2
q1
bi(J
Q
(x))dx.
2. Construction of {t˜1, . . . , t˜n}, for a given interval, (q1, q2). For an arbitrary open interval
(q1, q2), we construct the following tariffs:
t˜i(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
ti(q) + t1,i q  q1
0 q 2 (q1, q2)
ti(q) + t2,i q   q2,
where
t1,i =
8><>:0 i 2 A bi(qˆ)(q2   q1) + R q2q1 bi(JQ(x))dx i 2 B
and
t2,i =
8><>:bi(qˆ)(q2   q1) 
R q2
q1
bi(J
Q
(x))dx i 2 A
0 i 2 B.23
By construction, these tariffs satisfy a few key properties. First, the constructed tariffs are
23In the case in which types are uniformly distributed, t1,i = t2,i = 0 for every i, and the construction is
simple:
t˜i(q) =
8><>:ti(q) q 62 (q1, q2)0 q 2 (q1, q2).
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nonnegative. To see this for i 2 A, note that we have t˜i(q1) = ti(q1)   0 and
t˜i(q2) = ti(q2) + t2,i
= ti(q1) +
Z q2
q1
bi(J
Q
(x))dx+ t2,i (by (28))
= ti(q1) + bi(qˆ)(q2   q1)
  0 (because ti(q1)   0 and bi   0 for i 2 A),
with strict inequality for every principal i that is active over the interval (q1, q2) in the origi-
nal equilibrium.
A similar argument establishes nonnegativity for i 2 B.
A second property is that the constructed tariffs weakly increase over the interval for i 2 A
(i.e., t˜i(q2)   t˜i(q1)) and weakly decrease for i 2 B (i.e., t˜i(q2)  t˜i(q1)). This follows for
i 2 A from the third line in the above nonnegativity argument. Thus, even if t2,i is negative,
it is sufficiently small that principal i’s tariff remains nondecreasing. A similar argument
holds for i 2 B.
The third key property is that themarginal action for which principal i becomes active under
the original tariff ti (e.g., for i 2 A, the value of qb such that ti(qb) = 0 and ti(q) > 0 for all
q > qb) coincides with the marginal action under the newly constructed tariff. In the case
of an active principal i 2 A, the marginal action under the original tariff lies to the left of
q1; because we chose t1,i = 0, it follows that t˜i(q) = ti(q) for all q < q1. A similar argument
establishes that the marginal action is unchanged under the new tariffs for i 2 B.
3. Choice of (q1, q2). Corollary 3 gives the precise structure of q˜ that we wish to prove is an
equilibrium allocation.
q˜(q) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
q(q) q 2 [q1, q]
q1 q 2 (q0, q1)
q2 q 2 (q2, q0)
q(q) q 2 [q, q2],
where q0 is the unique agent type such that
S0(q1) + (b(q0)  q)q1 = S0(q2) + (b(q0)  q)q2.
We have so far required only that the interval (q1, q2) contain qˆ and that its length be suffi-
ciently small such that a principal’s activity is uniform over the interval and q(q) = qQ(q)
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for q 2 (q2, q1). We now impose the requirement that that (q1, q2) be chosen so that q0 = qˆ in
the above indifference relation. That is, we choose (q1, q2) so that
(29) S0(q1) + (b(qˆ)  qˆ)q1 = S0(q2) + (b(qˆ)  qˆ)q2
is satisfied by construction. Given qˆ and given # = q2   q1, there is a unique such choice of
(q1, q2) which has this property.
We have now fully described the proposed equilibrium tariffs and allocation. Below we
will demonstrate that such tariffs induce the agent to select q˜ (incentive compatibility) and
that each principal finds the constructed tariff, t˜i, to be a best response against the other
constructions, T˜ i.
4. Incentive compatibility. Because all tariffs are nonnegative, the agent will accept the profile
of constructed offers. For the moment, suppose that the agent is restricted to choose q 62
(q1, q2). Suppose also that we can establish that the marginal agent type indifferent between
q1 and q2 under the new tariffs coincides with qˆ:
(30) S0(q1)  qˆq1 + T(q1) +Â
i
t1,i = S0(q2)  qˆq2 + T(q2) +Â
i
t2,i.
In such a case, the aggregate tariffs would coincide (up to a constant) outside of the gap; i.e.,
the “margins” of these tariffs are equal outside of the gap. Because the agent cannot choose
an action inside of the gap and the marginal agent is qˆ, it follows that q˜ will be the agent’s
choice as required.
The work is in establishing that (30) will indeed hold given the choice of t’s in the proposed
construction. Given (29), proving (30) is equivalent to proving
b(qˆ)(q2   q1) = T(q2)  T(q1) +Â
i
(t2,i   t1,i).
Because (28) holds for all i, the required expression reduces to
b(qˆ)(q2   q1) 
Z q2
q1
b(J
Q
(x))dx =Â
i
(t2,i   t1,i).
But this expression is true by construction, given the formulae for each tk,i.
Lastly, we remove the restriction that the agent must select q 62 (q1, q2) and show that for
# sufficiently small, the agent would nonetheless never choose an action in the gap. This
requires
max
q2Q\(q,q2)
S0(q)  qq+ T˜(q)   sup
q2(q1,q2)
S0(q)  qq.
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By construction, T˜(q1) and T˜(q2) are both bounded away from zero. As such, the continuity
of S0 implies that the inequality is satisfied for # sufficiently small. With a sufficiently small
gap, we have therefore established that {t˜1, . . . , t˜n} implements q˜.
5. Principal optimality. To prove that t˜i is optimal, given T˜ i, we apply Lemma 1 and confirm
that for each i we satisfy the following two conditions for almost every q 2 Q:
U˜(q) = U˜ i(q) () bi(q) = 0,
q˜(q) 2 argmax
q2Q
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T˜ i(q).
We begin with the first requirement. Suppose that qˆi is the lowest type such that bi(q) = 0;
i.e., qˆi is the boundary type in principal i’s activity set in the original equilibrium. Thus, in
the original equilibrium, ti(q(q)) = 0 for all q   qˆi and ti(q(q)) > 0 for all q < qˆi. We need
to verify that a similar condition holds for the new equilibrium tariffs: t˜i(q˜(q)) = 0 for all
q   qˆi and t˜i(q˜(q)) > 0 for all q < qˆi. There are two cases to consider for i 2 A:
• qˆi < q2. In this case, principal i is inactive over the gap in the original equilibrium.
The tariff construction has t1,i = t2,i = 0 because bi(q) = 0 for q 2 (q2, q1). Hence,
t˜i(q˜(q)) = ti(q(q)) = 0 for q   qˆi and t˜i(q˜(q)) = ti(q(q)) > 0 for all q < qˆi.
• qˆi > q1. In this case, principal i is active over the gap in the original equilibrium.
The tariff construction has t1,i = 0, so t˜i = ti for q  q1. In particular, this implies that
t˜i(q˜(q)) = ti(q(q)) = 0 for q   qˆi and t˜i(q˜(q)) = ti(q(q)) > 0 for q 2 [q1, qˆi). Above,
we established that t˜i(q2)   t˜i(q1) for i 2 A. Because ti is nondecreasing in q for i 2 A
in the original equilibrium, so may we conclude that t˜i(q˜(q)) > 0 for all q < q1.
• Note that the third possible case of qˆi 2 (q2, q1) is ruled out by choice of sufficiently
small #.
A similar argument establishes that U˜(q) = U˜ i(q) () bi(q) = 0 holds for i 2 B under
the constructed tariffs.
Suppose for the moment that principal i is restricted to choose q 62 (q1, q2) and that the
following indifference condition is satisfied for principal i:
(31) S0(q1) + (bi(qˆ)  qˆ)q1 + T˜ i(q1) = S0(q2) + (bi(qˆ)  qˆ)q2 + T˜ i(q2).
Given T˜ i differs from T i by only a constant to the left and right of the interval, we have
for q  q2
argmax
q q2
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q) = argmax
q q2
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T˜ i(q),
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and for q   q1
argmax
qq1
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q) = argmax
qq1
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T˜ i(q).
If (31) is also satisfied, then we may conclude
argmax
q2Q\(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q) = argmax
q2Q\(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T˜ i(q).
We therefore seek to establish (31). Note that (31) is equivalent to
S0(q1) + (bi(qˆ)  qˆ)q1 + T˜(q1)  t˜i(q1) = S0(q2) + (bi(qˆ)  qˆ)q2 + T˜(q2)  t˜i(q2).
Using (30), we have the simpler condition
bi(qˆ)(q2   q1) = t˜i(q2)  t˜i(q1) = ti(q2)  ti(q1) + (t2,i   t1,i).
Using our construction for t˜i, this is equivalent to
bi(qˆ)(q2   q1) = ti(q2)  ti(q1) + bi(qˆ)(q2   q1) 
Z q2
q1
bi(J
Q
(x))dx.
Using (28), we conclude that (31) holds. Hence,
argmax
q2Q\(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T i(q) = argmax
q2Q\(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T˜ i(q).
What remains to show is that if principal i were allowed to choose q 2 (q1, q2), that for #
sufficient small, such a choice is not attractive. But given that there are at least two principals
active over (q1, q2), it follows that for all i 2 N, T˜ i(q1) and T˜ i(q2) are both positive and
bounded away from zero. Thus, for # sufficiently small
(32) max
q2Q\(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q+ T˜ i(q)   sup
q2(q1,q2)
S0(q) + (bi(q)  q)q.
6. Lastly, note that the aggregate tariff under the new equilibrium has the property that T˜(q) =
0 for q 2 (q1, q2) and T˜(q) = T(q) otherwise. Thus, all agent types are weakly worse off
under the new equilibrium tariffs, and those agents who previously chose q 2 (q1, q2) are
strictly worse off by revealed preference.
⇤
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Recall (15) that
qQ(q) = argmax
q2Q
S0(q)  qq+
 
Â
i2N
max
⇢
si   F(q)f (q) , 0
 !
q.
Because
Â
i2N
max
⇢
si   F(q)f (q) , 0
 
is convex in si, it weakly higher under s˜ compared to s. Define qˆi by si f (qˆi) = F(qˆi) and define q˜i
by s˜i f (q˜i) = F(q˜i). Choose i such that si < s˜i, and thus qˆi < q˜i . Then for any q 2 (qˆi, q˜i), the argmax
above is strictly higher under s˜ compared to s. It follows that the maximal allocation under s˜ is
weakly higher than that under s (and it is strictly higher for some types). ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: We first remind the expressions of rents and payments in the max-
imal equilibrium when s1 =  s2 = 1 < 2d (which ensures that both qˆ1 and qˆ2 are interior) and
the distribution is uniform on Q = [ d, d] withQ = [ 1  d, 1+ d]. From Proposition 4, we know
that, on the interval [ min(1  d, d),min(1  d, d)] that contains q0 = 0, the maximal equilibrium
policy is given by qQ(q) =  3q for q 2 [ 1+ d, 1  d]. The individual equilibrium schedules and
the aggregate payment are respectively
tQ1 (q) = t
Q
2 ( q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for q   3(1  d),
1
6 (q+ 3(1  d))2 for q 2 [ 3(1  d), 3(1  d)]
9
4 (1  d)2 + (1 d)2 q+ q
2
4 for q 2 [3(1  d), 1+ d]
and TQ(q) = tQ1 (q) + t
Q
2 (q), while the agent’s rent writes as
UQ(q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
9
4 (1  d)2 + 14 (1  d  2q)2 for q 2 [ d, 1+ d]
3(1  d)2 + 32q2 for q 2 [ 1+ d, 1  d]
9
4 (1  d)2 + 14 (1  d+ 2q)2 for q 2 [1  d, d].
We now construct an equilibrium with a discontinuity at q0 = 0 so that the discontinuity gap
[ q0, q0] remains in qQ([ 1+ d, 1  d]), i.e., on an area where principals’ activity sets overlap in
themaximal equilibriumwhich implies q0  3(1  d). In particular, we have TQ(q0) = TQ( q0) =
1
6 (q0 + 3(1  d))2 + 16 ( q0 + 3(1  d))2 = q
2
0
3 + 3(1  d)2. Following the proof of Proposition 1 and
using the specificity of the uniform distribution so that the construction in Footnote 23 applies, the
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so-constructed discontinuous equilibrium preserves aggregate and individual payments beyond
the discontinuity gap:
T(q) =
8><>:0 for q 2 ( q0, q0)TQ(q) for q   q0 and q  q0.
This yields the following expression of the agent’s rent in the discontinuous equilibrium:
(33) U(q) = min
⇢
UQ(q), qq0   q
2
0
2
+ TQ(q0), qq0   q
2
0
2
+ TQ( q0)
 
.
Following notations in the proof of Proposition 1, we denote q2 =  q1 =   q03 . To find out the
maximal value of the q0 that can be sustained, we again closely follow the proof of Proposition
1. The first condition to be checked is that the agent does not want to choose a decision in the
discontinuity gap. This condition rewrites in this specific context as:
(34) U(q) = max
q2qQ(Q)\( q0,q0)
 qq  q
2
2
+ TQ(q)   sup
q2( q0,q0)
 qq  q
2
2
⌘ q
2
2
8q 2 [q2, q1].
Using (33) to express the lefthand side and symmetry of the rent profile in q around the origin,
this condition holds when U(q) = qq0   q
2
0
6 + 3(1  d)2   q
2
2 for all q 2 [0, q1] which is always true
if it holds at q = 0, i.e., U(0) =   q206 + 3(1  d)2 > 0 but this latter inequality is always true for all
q0  3(1  d).
The second condition to be checked is (32) for each principal. Taking into account symmetry, it
suffices to verify that this condition holds for principal 1 which gives:
(35) max
q2q(Q)\( q0,q0)
 q
2
2
+ (1  d  2q)q+ tQ2 (q)   sup
q2( q0,q0)
 q
2
2
+ (1  d  2q)q 8q 2 [q2, q1].
When q0  3(1  d), the max on the lefthand side is achieved either at  q0 (for q 2 [0, q1]) or at q0
(for q 2 [q2, 0]). Again using symmetry, we focus on the case q 2 [0, q1] and note that the sup on
the righthand side can be rewritten so that (35) becomes:
(36)
3
2
(1  d)2   q
2
0
3
  R(q) =  2qq0 + max
q2[ q0,q0]
 q
2
2
+ (1  d  2q)q 8q 2 [0, q1].
Because the maximum of linear functions of q is convex,R is also convex in q. Using the envelope
theorem to evaluate the derivative of this max, it is immediate that R is also decreasing. Hence,
the condition always holds when it holds at q = 0. We compute
R(0) =
8><>:
(1 d)2
2 if q0 2 [1  d, 3(1  d)],
  q202 + (1  d)q0 if q0 2 [0, 1  d].
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Hence, (36) holds when 32 (1  d)2   q
2
0
3   R(0) which is true when q0 
p
3(1  d).
Welfare comparison. Fix q0 2 [0,
p
3(1  d)] (the case q0 = 0 corresponding to the maximal equilib-
rium). We know from Proposition 1 that the agent always prefers the maximal equilibrium to any
discontinuous equilibrium keeping aggregate payments the same outside the discontinuity gap.
Turning now overall expected payoff of the principals in a discontinuous equilibrium, we observe
that, because of opposite interests, this expected payoff is the opposite of their overall expected
payment. This expected payment writes as:
T (q0) = 12d
 Z   q03
 d
TQ(qQ(q))dq +
Z 0
  q03
TQ(q0)dq +
Z q0
3
0
TQ( q0)dq +
Z d
q0
3
TQ(qQ(q))dq
!
.
Observe that:
dT
dq0
(q0) =
1
2d
 Z 0
  q03
d
dq0
(TQ(q0))dq +
Z q0
3
0
d
dq0
(TQ( q0))dq
!
=
2q20
9d
.
Henceforth, T (q0) is convex for q0   0 and minimized at q0 = 0, i.e., the maximal equilibrium
is also preferred by the principals. Since both the principals and the agent prefers the maximal
equilibrium, welfare is higher at that equilibrium. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: This result follows from an immediate application of the arguments
in Proposition 2 for the case of A. For the case of B, note that the maximal allocation function is a
concave function of sB, and hence the inequalities (both weak and strict) are reversed. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: This result follows from an application of the arguments proving
Proposition 3 in the main text. ⇤
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: Given the assumptions of symmetry, qQ is symmetric around q = 0
and themean policy chosen by the agent is 0. Furthermore, any pairwise spread preserves symme-
try and is mean preserving. It is sufficient that we establish that any component pairwise spread
for some pair i results in a mean-preserving spread in qQ.
For q  0, note that the introduction of any increment Di can only increase qQ(q). There are
three cases to consider to establish this claim. Fixing q  0, after the increment is introduced,
either both principals are active, neither principal is active, or only principal i 2 A is active.
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For the first two outcomes, the increment has no effect on qQ for the type at q. When only i 2
A is active, however, the increment increases the marginal virtual preference for i 2 A, which
in turn increases qQ (given that S0 is differentiable and strictly concave, as maintained). Under
our assumptions on the distribution of q, there is always some region of inactivity. Hence, there
is a positive measure of types for which qQ strictly increases. For q   0, a reverse argument
establishes that qQ must weakly decrease (and strictly decrease on a set of positive measure).
Furthermore, given our symmetry assumptions, such changes in qQ are mean preserving, and
hence the resulting allocation leads to a greater dispersion in policy choices.
⇤
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